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INTRODUCTION
Let us imagine a brown ginger beer bottle produced by a well-known
global institution for your personal use. The bottle's label proudly
proclaims that in addition to reaching regions of the world that other
natural beverages cannot reach, its ginger beer is the best beverage that is
better than any municipal water: not even "probably" so, like mere Danish
beers, but indisputably so. This ginger beer is said to be more cost-
effective, more efficient, and quicker at quenching your thirst than any
other kind of beverage. The bottle's label contains no advisory, health
information, or other warning whatsoever. So, this green, eco-friendly
ginger beer is proclaimed as effectively "the only drink in town."
Now, let us also imagine that this global institution knows for certain
that at least fifty percent of those of us who drink its ginger beer are likely
to be greatly dissatisfied with this experience. In the ginger beer trade, the
fifty percent of dissatisfied consumers are known as "losers" while the
satisfied consumers are called "winners." Let us imagine further that those
of us who would like to be winners find, once the bottle is opened, that our
particular bottle contains not only a decomposed snail, which can make the
* Queen's Counsel, England and Wales, Arbitrator; Visiting Professor on
Investor-State Arbitration, Dickson Poon School of Law, King's College, University of
London.
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drinking experience less than satisfactory, but worse, that the bottle
contains no ginger beer at all. In the ginger beer trade, technically that is
called "annulled ginger beer."
There are two additional details. First, there is a legally binding contract
between the institution and the imbibers. This case is not an elderly case
from an old casebook on torts or delicts. It is not exactly clear what the
contract's applicable law might be or what court might have jurisdiction
over any dispute between the imbibers and the institution. However, it is
manifestly clear that the institution has assumed significant contractual
obligations toward the imbibers of its ginger beer bottles. Furthermore,
there may be certain non-contractual legal obligations on the institution as
a promoter, manufacturer, and supplier of ginger beer, depending on the
applicable law and the judicial forum. Second, the cost of a ginger beer
bottle is not a modest five U.S. dollars or so. Taking into account all costs,
the total can amount to millions, even tens of millions of U.S. dollars.
However, that price will remain unfixed at the time a user purchases the
bottle because it will usually be determined later by the institution itself.
While this ginger beer bottle may be cost-effective, its price will not be
cheap or fixed at the point of sale.
Now, on these facts, if we found the bottle empty or polluted, caused by
the negligent act or omission of the institution, would we be surprised to
learn that we had no legal claim against the institution? Would we also be
surprised to learn that both the institution and its workers had legal
immunity for any negligent act or omission on the ground of public policy?
That, because ginger beer is so important to the national and global
economy, ginger beer institutions and workers should not be held
accountable because it might adversely affect heir work? A lay person
would likely be surprised because he or she would expect the contrary and
so too would most regulators and legislatures. As a general principle, it is
usually accepted that every institution should be legally accountable for its
legal wrongs, including negligence, especially when the product sold is
professionally produced, heavily promoted, and significantly expensive.' If
we are not surprised, then we are almost certainly an arbitration user or an
arbitration specialist because, traditionally, arbitration users have often
been told that there was no possible legal claim against arbitrators and
arbitral institutions apart from fraud, corruption, criminal activity and
intentional wrongs. Other than these exceptions, there is no reported case
in England of any arbitrator or arbitral institution being held liable to any
1. There is here no exact analogy with the famous case where there was a
decomposed snail from Paisley in the ginger beer bottle. See Donaghue v. Stevenson
[1932] AC 362 (holding Mrs Donaghue had no contract with the manufacturer or the
tea-shop supplying the ginger beer.)
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arbitration user in the long-recorded history of English arbitration. The
same was also true in France, a country with a legal system and a judiciary
that is even more favorable to arbitration than England. However, this is
no longer the case.
First, regarding English law, the House of Lords decided two cases
concerning "quasi-arbitrators" (but not arbitrators as such), Sutcliffe v
Thackrah (1975) and Arenson v Arenson (1977) that the immunity for
arbitrators traditionally assumed by commentators might be ill-founded at
common law.2 As a result of this new judicial approach, the position of
arbitrators at English law became unclear; the Arbitration Act 1950 stated
nothing about arbitral immunity. It was even more doubtful that arbitral
institutions enjoyed any legal immunity at common law. In the first edition
of Mustill & Boyd's Commercial Arbitration, the authors analyzed the
different directions that English law might take in the future.3 Their third
possible direction concluded, "[a]rbitrators are not immune from suit.
There is no reason of public policy to exempt them from liability. ' 4 They
rejected that proposition on the grounds of the long tradition of arbitration
in England, but also of public policy so as to avoid "the worst of all
worlds."5  There was, however, no comfort for arbitral institutions.
Whereas an arbitrator might still claim a special status at common law, an
arbitral institution's relations with the parties was based on contract, not
status, with no room for immunity influenced by public policy at common
law.
Second, more recently in France in the FFIRC case (2010), the claimant
recovered substantial damages in contract from an arbitral institution under
French law.6 The institution was a specialist trade association that
organized an arbitration service for its members under its own arbitration
rules. There was a dispute between a French company and a Spanish
company that was referred to the institution under the parties' arbitration
clause in their contracts. In due course, the sole arbitrator made an award
in France ordering the Spanish company to pay substantial damages to the
French company. That award was judicially challenged by the Spanish
2. See Arenson v Arenson [1977] AC 405; Sutcliffe v Thackrah [1974] AC 727.
3. See Sir Michael J. Mustill & Stewart C. Boyd, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(Butterworth, 1982).
4. See id.
5. See id. at 192, 194-95; see also SIR MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C.
BOYD, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 11,224-32 (2d ed., Lexis Law Pub, 1989).
6. See Socirt6 Filature Fran~aise de Mohair v. Frdration Frangaises des
Industries Lainibres et Cotonni~res, (1 re Chambre 2010) JCP(G) No 51, 20 Dec 2010,
ann. Ortscheidt, Dalloz 2011.3023, ann T. Clay; see also Charles Price, Liability of
Arbitral Institutions in International Arbitration, in THE PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HANS VAN HOuTTE 187-93 (2012).
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company, resulting in a judgment of Cour d'appel de Paris that annulled the
award for failure to respect the rights of the defense. The following is what
had gone wrong: the sole arbitrator made his award without an oral hearing
on the basis of documentary materials sent to him by the institution.
However, under the arbitration rules, the institution was solely responsible
for the onward transmission of all evidentiary materials to the sole
arbitrator and the parties. One document that the institution received from
the French company was duly forwarded to the sole arbitrator, but by
innocent mistake, it was not sent by the institution to the Spanish company.
Inevitably, of course, the sole arbitrator based his award against the
Spanish company on the very document that the Spanish company did not
receive, depriving it of any opportunity to comment in its defense to the
French company's claim. Based on these circumstances, the Cour d'appel
had no difficulty in annulling the award under French law on the ground of
due process ("le principe de la contradiction"), leaving the French company
with a worthless, albeit expensive, piece of paper - in other words, an
annulled ginger beer bottle.
In olden times, the limitation period not having expired, the French
coimpany would simply have begun new atbitration proceedings and having
won once, it could reasonably anticipate winning again before a new
arbitration tribunal. But, these are more aggressive times in the Twenty-
First Century. Instead, the French company sued the institution for
damages before the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Nanterre. That court
decided that the institution was contractually liable in damages to the
French company for having failed in its legal responsibility to organize the
arbitration in accordance with its arbitration rules. The court awarded the
French company its legal costs incurred in the annulment proceeding (some
10,000 euros) and also part of its costs of the court proceedings (some
3,500 euros). However, the court rejected the claim for the face value of
the annulled award on the ground of causation given that the French
company could start a new arbitration against the Spanish company and
recover the same substantial damages with no apparent time bar for such
claim. The court also rejected the claim for moral damages, albeit finding
that there was no immunity for the institution under French law.
Why is this case of any interest to us? It is a decision by a relatively
minor court and the case is not even reported in the "Revue de l'arbitrage."
While it has attracted a number of legal commentaries elsewhere, the only
substantive article was written by Charles Price for a foreign audience.7
Mr. Price's article confirms that an arbitral institution can be liable in
contract to its disappointed users for substantial damages under French law.
7. See Price, supra note 6; see also Y. Derains & L. Kiffer, France, Int
Handbook Comm. Arb. 41, n. 147 (Kluwer; 2011).
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Like any institution comprised of human beings, an arbitral institution can
make a relatively small, innocent mistake with grave consequences for a
disputing party resulting in a significant liability for the institution itself. If
the applicable limitation period had time-barred the French company's
renewed claim, it seems clear that the amount of the award could have been
claimed as damages against the institution. The FFIRC dispute concerned
a relatively small amount, producing a modest award with insignificant
costs compared to a large international arbitration. What if such a dispute
had concerned millions or billions of U.S. dollars?
The FFIRC case, to which we shall return later, also shows that attempts
by an arbitral institution to protect itself in advance against liability are
limited. In an earlier French case decided in 2009, SNF S.A.S. v.
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),8 the court declared invalid
under French law the "ICC's" contractual attempt to exclude liability for
itself (and its arbitrators) under Article 34 of the 1998 ICC Rules.9 The
ICC had optimistically (but mistakenly) intended that new provision to
operate as an absolute immunity against all legal liability to users of ICC
arbitration everywhere. In contrast to French law, English law sought to
protect arbitral institutions with a limited form of statutory immunity under
Section 74 of the English Arbitration Act 1996.10 Unfortunately, such
statutory immunity is confined to the institution's appointment or
nomination of arbitrators unless the institution's acts or omissions are
shown to have been in bad faith. Moreover, this statutory immunity only
applies if the seat of the arbitration is in England and Wales; how the
immunity could apply to a suit against an arbitral institution outside
England under an applicable law other than English law is far from clear.
Today, given the increasingly aggressive tactics deployed by one-off users
8. SNF v ICC, JDI 2009.617, ann T. Clay; JIA 2009.579, ann. L. Kiffer.
9. International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules art. 34 (1998)
[hereinafter "1998 ICC Rules"] ("Neither the arbitrators, nor the Court and its
members, nor the ICC and its employees, nor the ICC National Committees shall be
liable to any person for any act or omission in connection with the arbitration.").
Following the SNF case, this wording was changed in Article 40 of the 2012 ICC
Rules, by adding at the end: "except to the extent such limitation of liability is
prohibited by applicable law."
10. Arbitration Act 1996 § 74 (United Kingdom) [hereinafter "English Arbitration
Act 1996"] ("(1) An arbitral or other institution or person designated or requested by
the parties to appoint or nominate an arbitrator is not liable for anything done or
omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of that function unless the act or
omission is shown to have been in bad faith. (2) An arbitral or other institution or
person by whom an arbitrator is appointed or nominated is not liable, by reason of
having appointed or nominated him, for anything done or omitted by the arbitrator (or
his employees or agents) in the discharge or purported discharge of his functions as
arbitrator. (3) The above provisions apply to an employee or agent of an arbitra or other
institution or person as they apply to the institution or person himself.").
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of international arbitration with no interest in the arbitral system beyond
winning (or not losing) their case, there is clearly a growing problem with
regard to the potential legal liability of an arbitral institution for its product,
namely impartial arbitrators deciding a dispute with a valid award.
There is also a growing problem for international arbitrators.
Increasingly, arbitrators are the collateral victims of attacks by a party on
the award and the arbitration itself. These collateral attacks often take the
form of a challenge to the arbitrator's impartiality and independence. In
some jurisdictions, a successful challenge against one of three arbitrators
may invalidate an award, even for unanimous decisions. A pending
challenge may influence the adverse party toward an otherwise unfavorable
settlement. In other jurisdictions, a pending challenge may automatically
stay the arbitration until it is resolved by a state court, preventing the
tribunal from proceeding with a partial award on liability to a final award
on quantum for an indefinite period of time.1 Recently, state courts have
called an unprecedented parade of international arbitrators to account, and
required several arbitrators personally to give evidence on oath before a
state court (usually at their own expense). These actions have taken place
in London, Stockholm, and most recently in New York and France - hardly
exotic venues hostile to international arbitration. In short, functional
immunity is no longer working for arbitration.
II. THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
With this background, let us look more closely and advance a possible
solution for the current practical problems facing arbitral institutions and
arbitrators regarding potential legal liability to disappointed users. I can do
so only in regard to English and French law because the subject is vast and
varied. Over the years, well-known treatises and articles have been
published including the work edited by Julian Lew in 1990, Susan Frank's
comparative survey in 2000, and Martin Meissner's more recent study. 2 I
shall also say nothing at all about the laws and practices of this jurisdiction.
I understand too little about the USA's different arbitral traditions.
11. See, e.g., International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Arbitration Rules (2003) [hereinafter "ICSID Arbitration Rules"]. A challenge,
however unmeritorious, will also suspend ICSID arbitration under ICSID Arbitration
Rule 9(10).
12. See Julian D. M. Lew, IMMUNITY OF ARBITRATORS (London Press Ltd, 1990),
reviewed J. Paulsson (1991) 107 LQR 688; Susan Franck, The Liability of
International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analysis and Proposal for Qualified
Immunity, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 15 (2000); Martin Maisner, Liability
and Independence of the Arbitrator, in CZECH (& CENTRAL EUROPEAN) YEARBOOK OF
ARBITRATION - 2012: PARTY AUTONOMY VERSUS AUTONOMY OF ARBITRATORS 149
(2012); see also Alan Redfern, The Immunity of Arbitrators, in THE STATUS OF THE
ARBITRATOR (ICC, 1995).
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However, my common premise is simply stated at the outset: today, in the
field of international arbitration everywhere, there are too many of us who
are washing our hands like Pontius Pilate in the face of increasing legal
risks to both arbitral institutions and arbitrators. As already described,
England and France have taken two different paths, but regrettably, the
result is materially the same. There is simply too much legal uncertainty
and too much risk for individual arbitrators and arbitral institutions to bear
alone. A great accident is bound to happen soon that may lead to the
forced insolvency of an old arbitral institution or the involuntary
bankruptcy of a much respected arbitrator. In particular, (1) individual
arbitrators are not corporations; (2) an arbitrator cannot easily limit his or
her legal liability (like a law firm); (3) there is no legal cap on damages
against an arbitrator or an arbitral institution (like shipowners, airlines, or
the medical profession); and (4) arbitral institutions themselves, even large
ones, are almost invariably non-profit organizations usually with little or
no capital assets. On that future day of reckoning, we may knowingly nod
to each other that we sadly saw it coming. We may also greatly regret that
our laws, judges, and legal systems can be so treacherous to innocent
victims unless we collectively do something. But, what can be done?
A. England and Wales
In English law, as with most common law systems, a professional person
usually operates under an obligation to exercise a duty of care and skill:
the breach of which may result in liability under both tort and contract law.
A new bridge does not usually collapse without someone's negligent fault,
probably by the engineer or the building contractor. If a new building
suddenly falls down, the architect will invariably be blamed. No engineer,
contractor, or architect will be entitled to immunity from suit. Therefore,
expectations are high for professional products and services, particularly if
that product or service is expensive. The professional person may have
contractual limitations or exclusions on liability, but municipal laws and
public policy will often regulate the scope of such contractual immunity.
Other than death or personal injury, a professional person can usually
contractually exclude a liability which he or she would otherwise attract in
tort or contract to the customer, save where that person is guilty of
deliberate wrongdoing (although the deliberate wrongdoing by an
employee for whom the professional is vicariously liable can usually be
contractually excluded).13  Under English law, there are statutory and
regulatory restrictions on the legal effect of such contractual exclusions,
notably under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and, regarding
13. CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS 10-17 (21st ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2014).
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consumers, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999
(enacting the EU Council Directive 93/13). At the present time, English
courts have yet to decide on these restrictions regarding arbitrators and
arbitral institution.
Until the decisions of the House of Lords, in the two English cases in
1974 and 1977 mentioned above, for at least 250 years it was firmly
assumed that an English arbitrator could not be sued in English law for
damages.14 There were many judicial obiter dicta to such effect in the law
reports, but none of the reported cases actually concerned arbitrators (as
distinct from quasi-arbitrators). Nonetheless, these dicta consistently
suggested that English law was clear, beyond all doubt, as stated and re-
stated in authoritative textbooks on arbitration.15 The first stone cast in this
still pond was Sutcliffe v Thackrah.16 It concerned an architect who, acting
as a certifier, allegedly issued negligent certificates for defective building
work. The plaintiff-owner then paid the contractor, but he became
insolvent and was unable to affect the necessary repairs. The trial judge
found the architect liable for negligence and awarded damages for the cost
of the repairs with no right to immunity from suit. The architect appealed.
The House of Lords, dismissing the appeal, decided that a certifier was not
a quasi-arbitrator and that there could be no analogy to the immunity of an
arbitrator. This case was not a case about arbitral immunity, but there were
important obiter dicta with four of the five judges expressing views that
there was arbitral immunity under English law. Yet, the question had been
raised.
The second case came before the House of Lords some two years later in
Aronson v Aronson.'7 It concerned an auditor valuing shares in a company
between the plaintiff seller and a buyer, where the sale contract provided
that the auditor's valuation would be final as regards the price to be paid to
the seller. The seller alleged that the valuation made by the auditor had
been negligently made and was too low. Following its earlier decision in
Sutcliffe v Thackrah, the House of Lords decided that the auditor could be
liable for negligence because he was not a quasi-arbitrator. Again, it was
not a decision about arbitral immunity as such; and three of the five judges
concurred in stating, obiter, that there was arbitral immunity because an
arbitrator, like a judge, was not liable in negligence at common law. In this
14. See supra note 3.
15. Until Mustill & Boyd's first edition, see supra note 3, in 1991, the specialist
works (including Halsbury, Russell, and Hogg), if they thought it necessary to address
the matter at all, re-stated the same position: arbitrators could not be sued in damages
(apart from fraud).
16. See Sutcliffe v Thackrah [1974] AC 727.
17. See Arenson v Arenson [1977] AC 405.
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case, there were important dicta from two other judges who said there
should be no arbitral immunity. Lord Kilbrandon and Lord Fraser, both
Scottish law lords, suggested that an arbitrator was no different from a
valuer and that, like a valuer, an arbitrator had no immunity from suit at
common law. It may be significant that these were Scottish and not
English judges; under Scots law, the legal principles underlying judicial
immunity are different from English law, making them inapplicable to a
private arbitrator. 
1 8
These important dicta from the two senior appellate judges caused
considerable concern within the English arbitral community. The Institute
of Arbitrators instructed Michael Mustill QC to advise its members
whether English law still conferred any immunity for damages on an
arbitrator alleged by one party to have been guilty of negligence. From
anecdotal evidence, it is possible that these instructions were also provoked
by legal proceedings brought against the Institute of Arbitrators for
allegedly appointing a wholly incompetent arbitrator without taking
reasonable care to ensure his competency, ending in catastrophic results for
one party. That case is not publicly reported. It may have been settled
before judgment, but it is clear that the issue at the time extended beyond
arbitral immunity to the position of an arbitral institution or appointing
authority in nominating or appointing an arbitrator. In 1977, in a long and
scholarly opinion, Michael Mustill QC advised that a degree of risk now
existed that arbitrators could be held liable in tort under English law.1" It is
impossible to exaggerate the influence of Michael Mustill on the
development of English arbitration over the last fifty years. He was always
the House of Lords "Mark Two," even as Counsel at the English Bar, long
before he began his distinguished judicial career. The result of his legal
opinion, amongst others, was the first attempt by the London Court of
International Arbitration (the "LCIA," then still part of the Institute of
Arbitrators) to exclude liability for arbitrators and the LCIA as an arbitral
institution in the LCIA's 1981 Rules.20  Further, as explained below,
Sections 29 & 78 of the later English Arbitration Act 1996 were enacted as
18. See generally Abimbola A. Olowofoyeku, SUING JUDGES: A STUDY OF
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY (Clarendon Press, 1994).
19. This legal opinion is not published. Yet, over the years, it has entered the
public domain.
20. See English Arbitration Act 1996 § 29 ("(1) An arbitrator is not liable for
anything done or omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of his functions as
arbitrator unless the act or omission is shown to have been in bad faith. (2) Subjection
(1) applies to an employee or agent of an arbitrator as it applies to the arbitrator
himself. (3) This section does not affect any liability incurred by an arbitrator by reason
of his resigning. But see id. § 25 ("Section 25 addresses the position of an arbitrator
who has resigned in regard to personal liability, fees and expenses, as to which the
Court may (not must) grant him relief.").
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mandatory provisions from which disputing parties cannot derogate in an
English arbitration - that is an arbitration with an English seat.2 1
Statutory immunity for arbitrators was considered extensively by the
Departmental Advisory Committee on the Law of Arbitration ("DAC")
which was responsible for the content of the English Arbitration Act 1996,
first chaired by (as he had become) Lord Justice Mustill. The DAC's
published reports on this issue confirmed the doubts and concerns caused
by the House of Lords' decision in Aronson v Aronson. In the DAC 1996
22Report, the DAC considered that at common law, there was "some
arbitral immunity" because the reasons for such immunity were the same as
those applying to judicial immunity under English law. The DAC added,
It is generally considered that an immunity is necessary to enable an
impartial third party properly to perform an impartial decision-making
function .... We feel strongly that unless a degree of immunity is
afforded, the finality of the arbitral process could well be undermined.
The prospect of a losing party attempting to re-arbitrate the issues on the
basis that a competent arbitrator would have decided them in favour of
their party is one that we would view with dismay.
23
That qualified phrase "some immunity" and the reasoning ostensibly
limited to arbitral "decision-making" raised questions as to the full scope
of such intended arbitral immunity. For example, was it intended by
Parliament to exculpate an arbitrator who, by his own negligence or his
own alleged negligence, failed to perform a sufficiently thorough conflict
check prior to or after his appointment, as a result of which, he or she is
successfully challenged by a party and the award set aside? That would not
appear to form part of an arbitrator's decision-making process regarding
issues comprising the party's dispute, particularly if he or she is not yet an
arbitrator at the relevant time. This situation may suggest that an
arbitrator's liability may not be fully exculpated by this statutory immunity.
Despite Michael Mustill's valiant attempts over the years, as both a scholar
and a judge, to maintain the arbitrator as having a distinct legal status under
English law (such status more easily supporting a functional immunity at
common law rather than a mere contractual relationship), the English
courts have now recognized that even with an extra-contractual legal
status, an arbitrator becomes a contractual party to a multilateral contract
made with the disputing parties, and if relevant, also the arbitral institution.
With such a contract for personal services, the arbitrator necessarily risks
21. See English Arbitration Act 1996 §§ 29, 78.
22. See Report, Departmental Advisory Committee on the Law of Arbitration,
Report on Arbitration Bill 1996 (Feb. 1996) [hereinafter "DAC 1996 Report"].
23. See DAC 1996 Report, supra note 22, at 132; Sir Michael J. Mustill &
Stewart C. Boyd, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 2001 COMPANION VOLUME 417ff
(Butterworth, 2001).
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contractual liability, subject to considerations of public policy for arbitral
decision-making.
Public policy at English common law, as the DAC had reported, was
based on the assumption that English arbitrators were like English judges.
However, that is manifestly not the case. First, international arbitrators are
not English judges. No English judge makes a contract with litigants nor is
an English judge paid by any litigant. There is no accurate analogy
between a state judge with imperium and an international arbitrator with
none. Moreover, England's senior judges enjoy absolute immunity under
English law, but that is not so of junior judges. There is no obvious reason
to equate English arbitrators, the majority of whom are not lawyers, with
senior members of the English judiciary. Moreover, in other jurisdictions,
we know that senior judges do not enjoy absolute immunity, such as
Austria.
Most importantly, immunity under English law has significantly receded
in other related areas. In Rondel v. Worsley, the House of Lords held that a
trial lawyer enjoyed immunity from suit for negligence in the conduct of
criminal proceedings.24 However, in Hall v Simons, the House of Lords
reversed itself, deciding that a trial lawyer enjoyed no immunity in both
25civil and criminal proceedings. It is an important case on immunity by
virtue of its new treatment of public policy considerations; the decision has
been followed in New Zealand and, regarding civil proceedings, in
Scotland.26 Given that judges will decide upon immunities enjoyed by
arbitrators and arbitral institutions, this decision provides no comfort in
assuming that the traditional arguments for such immunity under public
policy will prevail. Those arguments include, namely, that it allows
disappointed parties indirectly to attack the final decision of a tribunal, that
it bypasses the many procedural rules for impugning such a decision, and
that the risk of personal liability unreasonably interferes with the
independence and professionalism of the targeted defendant. All these
arguments, as applied to trial lawyers, were examined anew by the House
of Lords and firmly rejected. The result at common law is that arbitral
immunity is more questionable than ever. There should be no reason to
believe with any confidence that an arbitrator, still less an arbitral
institution, enjoys any functional immunity at common law in England, in
tort and, still less, in contract.
There is still the English Arbitration Act 1996 for arbitrations with an
English seat, and as already indicated, Section 74 of that Act provides a
24. See Rondel v. Worsley [1967] 1 AC 191.
25. See Hall v. Simons [2002] 1 AC 615.
26. See Chamberlain v. Lai [2005] SC 19/2005 (NZ); Wright v. Paton Farrell
[2006] 2006 SC 404 (Scotland).
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limited immunity to arbitral institutions for wrongful failures in the
appointment of arbitrators unless that wrong is shown to have been in bad
faith. Does this suffice for the 21st Century? In its 1996 Report, the DAC
provided two reasons for this statutory immunity.27  The first, as with
arbitral immunity, was the concern that the threat of litigation against the
institution could be used to reopen matters finally decided by an award.
The second was, in its words, of great importance:
Many organisations that provide arbitration services, including Trade
Associations as well as bodies whose sole function is to provide
arbitration services, do not in the nature of things have deep pockets.
Indeed much of the work is done by volunteers simply in order to
promote and help this form of dispute resolution. Such organisations
could find it difficult, if not impossible, to finance the cost of defending
legal proceedings or even the cost of insurance against such costs. In our
view, the benefits which these organizations and indeed individuals have
in arbitration generally, fully justified giving them a measure of
protection so that their good work can continue.
As a matter of legal logic, this rationale should have justified a larger
measure of statutory immunity for arbitral institutions. Work at the more
interventionist institutions like the ICC covers the organization of an
arbitration from beginning to end, far beyond the composition of the
original tribunal. It may include the prima facie assessment of jurisdiction,
the removal of an arbitrator, the grant of extensions of time for the award
and intermediate procedural steps, the arrangement of advance payments
by the parties on account of arbitration costs, the suspension of those
payments in a deposit account, the determination of the final amount of
arbitral fees and expenses, the scrutiny of the draft award, and the issuance
of the award to the parties. This process certainly consists of far more than
merely appointing ICC arbitrators. I have already described how the scope
of Section 74 is also limited to an arbitration with an English seat. In short,
the limited scope and application of Section 74 is no longer fit for purpose,
29if it ever was.
As for international conventions, the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") Convention of 1965 was enacted into
English law in 1966, whereby ICSID as an arbitral institution and ICSID
27. See DAC 1996 Report, supra note 22.
28. DAC 1996 Report, supra note 22, at 301; Report, Departmental Advisory
Committee on the Law of Arbitration, Supplementary Report on English Arbitration
Act 1996, at 38 (1997); see also Mustill & Boyd, supra note 23, at 444, 469.
29. In 1995, the DAC had been ready to consider recommending to the UK
Government a broader form of statutory immunity, but the arbitral institutions did not
consider it important - at that time.
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arbitrators enjoy statutory immunity. But, the ICSID Convention is a
solitary exception amongst arbitral conventions. There is nothing about
immunity in the 1958 New York Convention.31 There is also nothing in the
1985 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
32("UNCITRAL") Model Law on Arbitration. This omission was
addressed by UNCITRAL's former Secretary, Gerald Hermann, in his 1998
Freshfields Lecture.33  There, he explained that, at UNCITRAL, the
national delegations abstained from touching the issue of arbitral immunity,
preferring "to let sleeping dogs lie" for the Model Law. The trouble with
sleeping dogs is that they eventually wake up. Soon, as a tactical measure,
arbitrators were threatened personally with challenges and claims against
them. Accordingly, twenty-five years after the Model Law, UNCITRAL
reconsidered arbitral immunity when drafting its new UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules 2010. 34 It was a long and troubled debate.
That debate started with the working paper prepared for the UNCITRAL
Working Group on Arbitration.35  This unofficial working paper
recommended a provision, which by contract would form part of an
arbitration agreement under the new UNCITRAL rules. It was to the effect
that no arbitrator (including his or her employees or assistants), secretary,
or expert to the Tribunal, "shall be liable to any party for any act or
omission in connection with the performance of his or her tasks under these
Rules except if that act or omission was manifestly in bad faith." It was
intended that "bad faith" would be included in this exception, as also a
deliberate violation of the arbitration agreement and the UNCITRAL
Rules. It was also suggested that UNCITRAL might consider extending
this contractual immunity to persons or institutions performing the function
of an appointing authority under the UNCITRAL Rules although the
Permanent Court of Arbitration ("PCA") itself, as an appointing authority
under the UNCITRAL Rules, was legally immune from suit. During the
elephantine gestation of the 2010 Rules, the new Article 16 eventually
emerged: "[s]ave for intentional wrongdoing, the parties waive to the
30. See ICSID Convention, Art. 21 (Apr. 2006) [hereinafter "ICSID Convention"].
31. See generally New York 1958 Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, (UNCITRAL).
32. See generally Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
UNCITRAL (1985) [hereinafter "UNCITRAL Model Law"].
33. See Gerold Herrmann, Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation
on Arbitration?, 15 ARB. INT'L 211 (1999). As a consequence, several Commonwealth
jurisdictions enacting the UNCITRAL Model Law added their own statutory provision
on arbitral immunity (for example, Bermuda).
34. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL (rev. 2010) [hereinafter
"2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules"].
35. See generally Working Paper, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and
Regulations (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter "Suggested Changes to ICSID Rules"].
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fullest extent permitted under the applicable law any claim against the
arbitrators, the appointing authority, and any person appointed by the
arbitral tribunal based on any act or omission in connection with the
arbitration.,36  As the accompanying UNCITRAL commentary makes
clear, the rationale for this contractual exclusion was, "to ensure that
arbitrators were protected from the threat of potentially large claims by
parties dissatisfied with an arbitral tribunal's rulings or rewards who might
claim that such rulings or rewards arose from the negligence or thought of
an arbitrator.,37  This immunity is intended to protect the arbitrator's
decision-making process in an UNCITRAL arbitration. However, the
UNCITRAL Rules do nothing to protect an arbitral institution acting other
than as an appointing authority under the UNCITRAL Rules.
38
From an English perspective, international conventions, model laws, and
rules of arbitration provide little actual guidance. We are left only with the
limited statutory provisions in the English Arbitration Act 1996 and
multifarious, untested contractual exclusion clauses, such as Article 31 of
the 1998 LCIA Rules (as since modified by Articles 31.1 and 31.2 of the
2014 LCIA Rules).39 Regarding immunities in the LCIA Rules, as
indicated, their history began with the 1981 LCIA Rules following Michael
Mustill QC's influential legal opinion in 1977. Article 14(1) of the 1981
LCIA Rules excluded liability for the LCIA Court and LCIA arbitrators for
any act or omission in connection with the arbitration, but with regard to
LCIA arbitrators (albeit not the LCIA Court), it excluded "the
consequences of any conscious and deliberate wrongdoing" on the
arbitrator's own part from this immunity. Article 19.1 of the 1985 Rules
repeated this provision. It was revised in Article 31 of the 1998 LCIA rules
to allow also for the liability of the LCIA Court in the case of its own
conscious and deliberate wrongdoing. Article 31 of the 1998 Rules also
reversed the burden of proof requiring the claimant to prove wrongdoing by
the LCIA Court or LCIA arbitrator, rather than impose a negative
obligation on the LCIA Court or LCIA arbitrator to disprove such
wrongdoing in order to qualify for contractual immunity. To my
36. See 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 34 art. 16.
37. See Report, UNCITRAL Working Group II, (Arbitration and Conciliation) on
the work of its fifty-second session ealand(A/CN.9/688) 46 (2010).
38. If the arbitral institution is the PCA, it will enjoy a broader immunity under its
founding treaties. It is not clear whether such a broader immunity would benefit
arbitrators appointed by the PCA under the UNCITRAL Rules, outside the Netherlands
(where the PCA has its headquarters).
39. See LCIA Arbitration Rules § 31 (1998); now LCIA Arbitration Rules § 31.1
and 31.2 (2014). Apart from liability in tort or under the LCIA Rules, there is no reason
why an arbitrator could not be liable in contract under English law. See M. Smith,
Contractual Obligations Owred by and to Arbitrators." Model Terms of Appointment, 8
ARB INT 17 (1992).
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knowledge, none of these provisions has yet been tested in litigation in
England or abroad.
It is not surprising to see a provision for the immunity of the LCIA as an
arbitral institution because, like the ICC, its functions extend far beyond the
appointment of arbitrators and are not simply administrative under the
LCIA Rules. Although, unlike the ICC, the LCIA does not actively control
the conduct of the arbitration or vet draft awards (thereby taking
responsibility for both), the LCIA decides challenges to arbitrators,
provides written reasons to the parties for such challenges, acts as a
deposit-holder for the parties, and fixes the final amount of arbitral fees
and expenses under the LCIA Rules. None of these functions are unusual
for many arbitral institutions around the world. Would its contractual
exclusion work in practice if tested for LCIA arbitrators and the LCIA both
in English and particularly in non-English litigation? For that analysis, we
need to go back to France.
B. France
Under French law, as in English law, there is a bilateral legal agreement
between the contracting parties to an arbitration clause. But, even before
that agreement, there is a standing offer made by the arbitration institution
recommending to the world, including these contracting parties, that the
institution is ready, willing, and able to administer an arbitration resulting
from the parties' arbitration agreement. Once the arbitration has
commenced, under French law there is a multilateral legal relationship
between the parties and the institution where the arbitrators become parties
upon their respective appointments.40  This means that, unlike a French
judge, an arbitrator and an arbitral institution can be sued in contract at
French law. Regarding arbitrators, this position was confirmed in the 2008
decision by the Cour d'appel de Paris in legal proceedings brought by a
disappointed party against three arbitrators.4 ' The French courts have
recognized that an arbitrator could be liable in contract under French law,
holding that a French arbitrator is charged with a "mission" or task, which
that arbitrator must complete in good conscience, independence, and
impartiality. Although an arbitrator enjoys a functional legal immunity
under French law, the French cases establish that immunity does not
exclude liability for fraud, denial of justice, and gross negligence
("6quivalente au dol, constitutive d'une fraude, d'une faute lourde ou d'un
deni de justice"). Applied to an arbitral institution, the Paris Cour de
Cassation confirmed in the 2001 Cubic case that an arbitral institution
40. See Philippe Fouchard, Les institutions permanentes d'arbitrage devant lejuge
tatique (cipropos d'unejurisprudence rcente, REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 225 (1987).
41. Charasse c/D REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 376 (2009), ann. P. Leboulanger.
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could be held liable in contract to a disputing party under French law.42
An arbitral institution is not an arbitrator; therefore, it is not required to
respect the rights of the defense or to provide its decisions in the form of an
award subject to judicial review. However, as analyzed at length by
Professor Philippe Fouchard in his 1987 article: "[t]he French cases
established that an arbitral institution is contractually obliged to respect its
own arbitration rules, and it may also be obliged to ensure a fair procedure
for the arbitration" ("un procbs 6quitable").43  In his article, Professor
Fouchard concluded that it would be inconceivable that an arbitral
institution, paid for its services, could benefit from any legal immunity
under French law.
44
It was against this legal background that the ICC introduced Article 34
of its 1998 ICC Rules,45 ostensibly granting an absolute immunity for ICC
arbitrators, the ICC Court, and the ICC without any exception. The
drafting of this new article provoked considerable controversy within the
ICC. However, the ICC Council decided at its meeting in Shanghai in
1997 upon the absolute form of contractual immunity, which became part
of the 1998 ICC Rules.4 6 Many legal scholars predicted that this broad
wording, without any exceptions for fraud, corruption, or deliberate
wrongdoing, could never survive judicial scrutiny in a state court. These
critics included, famously, Professor Pierre Lalive and the ICC National
Committees from France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. They were soon
proven right.
In the SNF case (2009), the French courts had to consider the validity of
Article 34 of the 1998 ICC Rules in legal proceedings brought by a
disappointed party against the ICC as an arbitral institution.47  This
litigation was part of a larger battle between two commercial parties arising
from two ICC awards made in Brussels that raged in the French and
Belgian courts (where the ICC was not a party). SNF's claim against the
42. See Soci~t6 Cubic Defense Systems Inc v. Chambre de Commerce
international, Cour de cassation 1re ch civ: 20 (Feb. 2001); see also T. Clay note in
Rev arb 2001.511; P. Lalive, Rev arb 1999.103; P. Lalive, "Sur l'irresponsibilit6
arbitrale", Etudes de proc&dure et d'arbitrage en I'honneur de Jean-Frangois Poudret
(1999); and Philippe Fouchard ET. AL, FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1153-1155 (Savage and Gaillard eds.,
1999).
43. See Fouchard, supra note 40.
44. See Fouchard, supra note 40, at 225, 251.
45. See 1998 ICC Rules, supra note 9 art. 34.
46. See W. Laurence Craig ET. AL, ANNOTATED GUIDE TO THE 1998 ICC
ARBITRATION RULES: WITH COMMENTARY 183-84 (1988).
47. See SNF SAS v. Chambre de commerce international, Cour d'appel of Paris
(2009), ann C. Jarosson Rev arb 2010.314; see also Rev arb 2007.847 and R. Dupeyre,
32:2 ASA Bulletin 265.
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ICC in France alleged that the ICC had effectively conspired with the
arbitrators to evade illegally the European Union's mandatory competition
rules contrary to French law and international public policy. During these
proceedings, the Cour d'appel of Paris required the ICC to disclose its
confidential papers relating to the work of the ICC Court in approving the
two draft awards under the ICC rules. It further publicly criticized the ICC
in its judgment for being reluctant to provide the essential papers to the
Court. This criticism was without precedent in the ICC's long experience
of as a litigant in France. It was a bad omen. Having examined the
confidential papers, the court rejected any liability of the ICC. It then went
out of its way to declare that Article 34 was invalid under French law, its
absolute terms purporting to excuse the ICC wrongly for performing its
essential contractual obligation as an arbitral institution towards the parties.
There were, of course, a number of"I told you so's." But, "I told you" is
never a solution. The solution chosen by the ICC for its new 2012 ICC
Rules is the limited language of the new exclusion in Article 40. Article 40
seeks to exclude liability for a large number of people, including ICC
arbitrators, the ICC Court, and the ICC itself, "for any act or omission in
connection with the arbitration except to the extent that such limitation of
liability is prohibited by applicable law." Will this exclusion work any
better than the old wording? Only time will tell. It will not be a benevolent
arbitrator who will so decide, but a state court and not necessarily a court in
France. In the meantime, little comfort is provided by the ICC Secretariat's
Guide to ICC arbitration as recently published. The rationale provided
there for this contractual immunity is based on the suggestion, "such bodies
and individuals [were] exposed to liability"; "this could hinder their work
making it difficult for them to provide the required level of service."'8 That
simplistic rationale is not applied to other professions, such as engineers,
architects, building contractors, trial lawyers, and even ginger beer
manufacturers. It is not an argument that will carry the day in any state
courts, nor indeed before any regulators.
III. A PRACTICAL SOLUTION
In a little box at the very end of the ICC Guide, "Note to Arbitrators and
Experts - Liability Insurance," the following words appear: "[a]rbitrators
and experts are advised to obtain insurance that adequately covers their
work in arbitration matters so as to minimize the risk associated with any
potential liability." Where contractual and statutory immunities are
insufficient under English and French law, could such legal liability
insurance be the Holy Grail as the only safe and certain solution for




arbitrators and arbitral institutions? It seems to me that we are only left
with professional indemnity insurance as the most effective practical
solution to the potential liabilities of arbitrators and arbitral institutions.
For arbitrators who do not practice as arbitrators as a separate profession,
there is usually adjectival cover for acting as an arbitrator that forms part of
the professional liability insurance required by their regulator or
professional body. For example, a practicing member of the English Bar
has cover for arbitral liability as part of the professional liability cover
required to practice as a barrister (as do avocats at the Paris Bar).
However, many full-time arbitrators do not exercise a separate profession,
particularly if they have retired from professional practice or from a
judicial career or have chosen to pursue an academic career from the outset.
Many of these arbitrators, including some of the best-known international
arbitrators, may carry no professional indemnity insurance at all. Even for
those arbitrators that have insurance, the geographical scope of the cover
may be limited given the insurance market's traditional divisions between
North American and non-North American risks. It is also difficult for an
individual arbitrator personally to negotiate insurance cover: (1) the legal
risks are too uncertain for underwriters; (2) they are complicated to explain
satisfactorily; (3) insurers prefer high volumes and not singletons as
insureds; and (3) as a result, even if cover is available, insurance premiums
for individual cover can be very expensive.
If cover is to be obtained, it could be more easily done for a large group
under a master policy that is agreed with one insurer, possibly even a
captive operating with its own reinsurance programme. It could be done
with little or no controversy, particularly because the ICC has set an
important example that could be adopted and supported by other arbitral
institutions, independently, or with a group cover collectively negotiated by
IFCAI or ICCA. Today, the ICC carries professional indemnity cover, not
only for itself and the ICC Court, but also for ICC arbitrators. This fact has
only recently become publicly known, although the terms of such cover
remain discretely veiled for good reason. It means that a small part of the
administrative fees payable by the disputing parties to the ICC Court
constitutes an insurance premium covering legal liability for both the ICC
and ICC arbitrators. Is that not the basis for a practical solution to the
problem?
Insurance cover, at least for arbitrators, does not need to be for a
significant insured sum. An honest arbitrator is unlikely to be held liable in
negligence for substantial damages measured in tens or hundreds of
millions of dollars for making a wrong award as part of the decision-
making process. Yet, an arbitrator is increasingly likely to be made a party
to a legal proceeding brought in bad faith by a disappointed party as a
collateral attack on an award. For example, this can be done not only by
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challenging the arbitrator's impartiality or independence, but also by
instituting disciplinary proceedings before his or her professional body, or
by threatening other legal proceedings directly against him, whether for
alleged contempt of court, alleged defamation, or alleged criminal conduct.
What an arbitrator then needs is not so much an indemnity against legal
liability for damages, but rather immediate defense cover from an insurer
so as to defend against such malign proceedings. These defense costs for
an individual arbitrator can be expensive and in some cases, have run into
six figures (USD). It seems wrong for an individual, uninsured arbitrator to
bear such costs and expenses -alone, particularly when the proceedings
against him or her fail or are abandoned, having exhausted their collateral
purpose. It does not seem right, as we saw in the USA (regarding legal
proceedings brought against three arbitrators acting in a Geneva
arbitration), to rely on local arbitration specialists giving so generously of
their time to defend the impugned arbitrators pro bono. The same
arguments apply equally to big and small arbitral institutions. This
relatively modest cover for defense costs, with a relatively small sum
insured for any legal liability, ought to be possible to place in current
market conditions if sufficient numbers of arbitrators and institutions were
willing to subscribe to such group insurance. It is now needed, but will it
be done?
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude with a story about Norwegian lemmings. As you may
well know, a lemming is a small, furry, brown rodent living in large
numbers in the arctic tundra. From the beginning of time, every four years
the lemming population plummets to near-extinction. For reasons never
fully understood and also much disputed by scientists, migrating lemmings
commit mass suicide by jumping into the ocean and swimming collectively
to their watery deaths. At school many years ago, I became a minor expert
on Norwegian lemmings because a friend and I were applying for a travel
scholarship to northern Norway to observe the lemming migration.
However, our scholarly application, of which we were mistakenly proud,
was summarily rejected by the scholarship committee because we had
chosen the wrong year. It was an off-year of non-migration with no mass
suicides by lemmings, and we were not allowed to resubmit a more timely
application. Like Norwegian lemmings, we may continue our lives as
arbitrators and arbitral institutions for the next several off-years. I may be
wrong again about the exact time, but unless we do something soon, we can
be morally certain that one day a calamity will befall the international
arbitral community. We should at least attempt a solution soon. If we tried
together (arbitral institutions, arbitrators, and arbitration users), we could
certainly do better than lemmings.
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